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Article 6

Application of the Undue Burden Test to Mass
Transportation: Parallel or Pitfall
Recent estimates indicate that there are approximately 31.5 mil-

lion' physically disabled individuals 2 in the United States. Many of
these individuals face significant barriers to their use of mass transportation 3 which inhibit their ability to share equally in4employment, educational, residential, and recreational opportunities.
This Comment analyzes federal statutes enacted by Congress to
guarantee equal access to mass transportation to handicapped individuals.5 The Comment also tracks the federal regulations implementing

1. 1983 WORLD ALMANAC 962. Statistics issued by the National Center for Health
Statistics, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, indicate that in 1979 these individuals were limited in their activity by physical handicaps including arthritis, rheumatism,
heart conditions, hypertension not related to heart problems, diabetes, asthma, impairments
of the back and spine, impairments of the lower extremity or hip, and visual and hearing
impairments. Based on unpublished data from the NATIONAL HEALTH INTERVIEW SURVEY,
NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN
SERVICES, NINTH REVISION OF THE INTERNATIONAL CLASSIFICATION OF DISEASES. The

report also indicated that approximately 8.1 million individuals were unable to carry on any
major activity whatever. Id.
2. 45 C.F.R. § 84.3(i) (1981), a regulation promulgated under title 45 and relating to
public welfare, defines physical or mental impairment as: "(A) any physiological disorder or
condition, cosmetic disfigurement, or anatomical loss affecting one or more of the following
body systems: neurological; musculoskeletal; special sense organs; respiratory including
speech organs; cardiovascular, reproductive, digestive, genito-urinary; hemic and lymphatic;
skin; and endocrine; or (B) any mental or psychological disorder, such as mental retardation,
organic brain syndrome, emotional or mental illness, and specific learning disabilities."
3. The federal statute governing mass transportation for the disabled is 49 U.S.C.
§ 1612 (Supp. IV 1980).
4. President Nixon, in urging action to guarantee disabled and elderly persons equal
access to public transportation, noted: "Isolated from regular contact with society, many of
our handicapped citizens lead lives of lonely frustration. Working together, on both private
and public levels we can-and must-insure full lives for them. Together we can topple the
environmental barriers which prevent the handicapped from entering buildings or using
public transportation;. . . and we can bring all of our handicapped fellow citizens into the
mainstream of American Life." Proclamation No. 4001, 6 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1169
(Sept. 8, 1970). Representative Henry C. Reuss, in urging support for the 1970 Urban Mass
Transportation Act, see infra notes 12-20, stated: "While we have done our utmost for automobile owners and truckers, we have left the poor, the aged, and the handicapped stranded
in our urban centers-stranded by transit systems that if operative at all can take them
neither safely, nor speedily nor economically, to the jobs and assistance they need." 116
CONG. REC. 34174 (1970).
5. Primary emphasis will be placed on § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L.
No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 394 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976)), see infra note 28 &
accompanying text; the Urban Mass Transportation Acts (codified as amended at 49 U.S.C.
[4911
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this policy.6 It then analyzes American Public Transit Association v.
Lewis, 7 in which the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
reversed the district court and held that, despite the congressional mandate in section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,8 local governments cannot be forced to make "burdensome modifications" to their
facilities in order to accommodate the handicapped. 9 In so holding, the
court of appeals sought to apply the rationale used by the United States
Supreme Court in Southeastern Community College v. Davis,'0 which
upheld the right of a college to bar participation of a deaf applicant in
its nursing program. This Comment contrasts the more recent decision
of Dopico v. Goldschmidt,II which distinguished the Southeastern decision on its facts and held that handicapped persons have a right of
reasonable access to mass transit systems under the authority of section
504. The Comment concludes that the Lewis decision misapplies the
rationale used by the Court in Southeastern and that section 504, by
itself and in conjunction with other federal statutes, can require local
transit authorities to make reasonable modifications to their mainline
systems in order to accommodate qualified handicapped individuals.
Federal Statutes
Urban Mass Transportation Act
Congress has passed several federal statutes directed at solving the
problem of access to public transportation by the physically handi-2
capped. The first was the Urban Mass Transportation Act (UMTA),1
passed in 1964 and amended in 1970. The Act provided state and local
governments with federal financial assistance for mass transportation

programs. 13
Notwithstanding this aid, urban transportation systems continued
to deteriorate and public transportation within urban centers became a
§§ 1601-1612 (1976)), see infra note 13 & accompanying text; and the Federal-Aid Highway
Act of 1973, 23 U.S.C. § 142 (1976), see infra note 21 & accompanying text.

6. Primary focus is placed on the "special efforts" requirements of 49 C.F.R. § 613(b)
(1976), see infra note 34 & accompanying text, and on the Department of Transportation
(DOT) regulations requiring "mainstreaming" of the physically handicapped, codified at 49
C.F.R. § 2781 (1981), see infra note 42 & accompanying text.
7.

655 F.2d 1272 (D.C. Cir. 1981), rev'g American Pub. Transit Ass'n v. Goldschmidt,

485 F. Supp. 811 (D.D.C. 1980).
8. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1973).
9.

655 F.2d 1272, 1278 (D.C. Cir. 1981).

10.

442 U.S. 397 (1979). See infra note 67 & accompanying text.

11.

687 F.2d 644 (2d Cir. 1982), rev'g in part 518 F. Supp. 1161 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).

12. 49 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1612 (1976) [hereinafter cited as UMTA].
13. Id. In 1964, Congress passed a $75 million transportation assistance program to
help selected cities preserve their urban transit service by converting failing private companies to public ownership. Id. Between 1966 and 1969, an additional $600 million was au-

thorized for the program. See id § 1603(b) (1970).
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pressing federal concern. 14 In response, Congress passed the Urban
Mass Transportation Assistance Act in 1970,15 which amended the
UMTA and substantially increased the funds to be appropriated to insure that "all citizens" would be able to move quickly and at a reasonable cost. 16 These 1970 amendments permitted the Secretary of

Transportation to set aside one and one-half percent of funds available
for research, development, and demonstration projects to be used to
increase the information and technology available for planning and designing transit systems accessible to the handicapped.17 Congress also
added section 16 to the UMTA, which states that elderly and handicapped persons have the same right as other persons to utilize mass
transportation facilities and services. 18 Section 16 authorizes the Secretary of Transportation to make grants and loans to state and local authorities for the purpose of making mass transportation services
accessible to the handicapped. 19
Congress again demonstrated its intent to make transportation accessible in 1975 when, in appropriating funds to implement UMTA for
that year, it attached a rider to the bill emphasizing that all funds had
20
to be used to design and purchase accessible transportation modes.
The UMTA expresses Congress' intent that recipients of federal transportation assistance take affirmative steps to provide handicapped individuals with accessible public transportation. 2 '
14. See id § 1601(a) (1970).
15. See Pub. L. No. 91-453, 84 Stat. 962 (1970).
16. 49 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (1970).
17. Id § 1612(c); see also 116 CONG. REc. 34,180 (1970) (statement of Rep. Biaggi).
18. Section 16 is codified at 49 U.S.C. § 1612 (1970). It states: "It is hereby declared to
be the national policy that elderly and handicapped persons have the same right as other
persons to utilize mass transportation facilities and services; that special efforts shall be
made in the planning and design of mass transportation facilities and services so that the
availability to elderly and handicapped persons of mass transportation which they can effectively utilize will be assured; and that all federal programs offering assistance in the field of
mass transportation (including programs under this Act) should contain provisions implementing this policy."
19. Id.
20. "None of the funds provided under this Act shall be available for the purchase of
passenger rail or subway cars, for the purchase of motor buses or for the construction of
related facilities unless such cars, buses, and facilities are designed to meet the mass transportation needs of the elderly and the handicapped." Department of Transportation and
Related Agencies Appropriation Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 93-391, § 315, 88 Stat. 781 (1974).
21. Representative Biaggi, in introducing § 16 of the UMTA, stated: "Other proposals
have been offered that would set up special transportation facilities for the elderly and the
handicapped. Others would provide subsidies for the elderly so that these people could use
more expensive services such as taxicabs or limousines. However, besides the factor of costs
for these programs, they would further serve to segregate the elderly and the handicapped
from our society. This Nation has been insensitive to the needs of those Americans for too
long. I think it is time this Congress saw to it that equal rights to transportation facilities are
extended to these 44 million citizens." 116 CONG. REc. 34,180-81 (1970) (emphasis added).
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Federal-Aid Highway Act

In the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1973 (FAHA), 22 Congress extended its policy of improving mass transportation for all citizens by
23
allowing the use of highway funds for mass transportation projects.
The Senate Report of the 1973 FAHA extends the existing policy of
24 to bus and rail improvements financed
section 16(A) of the UMTA
25
Act.
Highway
the
under
In 1975, the FAHA was amended to require that mass transit
projects funded with federal highway funds be constructed and oper26
ated to allow effective utilization by elderly and handicapped persons.
The amendment also directed the Secretary of Transportation not to
provide any federal financial assistance to programs or projects that did
not comply with these stated goals.27 The FAHA therefore reflected a

continuing congressional concern with and commitment to integrating
handicapped persons into mainstream transportation systems.
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973

Congress also recognized the rights of the handicapped by passing
section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (section 504),28 which provides that "[n]o otherwise qualified handicapped individual in the
Support for accommodating the needs of the handicapped with federal assistance was also
noted in the remarks of Senator Magnuson: "[U]rban mass transit is far more than a response to congestion. It serves a population segment-the old, the young, the sick, the handicapped, and the impoverished-which virtually has no other means of travel." Id. at 2255;
see also id. at 34,164 (remarks of Rep. Patman). Long after the House had unanimously
incorporated § 16 into the UMTA, Representative Biaggi, introducing § 315 of the Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriation Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 93391, 88 Stat. 781 (1975), see supra note 20, reaffirmed congressional intent when he noted: "I
am offering this amendment to reaffirm our national policy that elderly and handicapped
persons have the same right as other persons to utilize mass transportation facilities and
services. When this policy was first enunciated in my amendment to the 1970 Urban Mass
Transportation Assistance Act, it [was] hailed as the emancipation proclamation for the
handicapped. . . . I want to see steps in buses eliminated-andthey can be. I want to see
escalators and elevators instead of stairways-andthey can be put in. I want to see gates
insteadof turnstyles--and we can have them. I want to see mass transportationforall Americans-and we can have it." 120 CONG. REc. 19,851 (1974) (emphasis added).
22. Pub. L. No. 93-87, 87 Stat. 250 (1973) [hereinafter cited as FAHA].
23. 23 U.S.C. § 142 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
24. 49 U.S.C. § 1612 (1976). See supra note 18.
25. S. REP. No. 93-61, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1973).
26. Federal-Aid Highway Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-643, § 105, 88 Stat.
2281, 2282 (1975) (codified at 23 U.S.C. § 142 (1976): "It is ... the Committee's intent that
any project receiving funds. . . to the maximum extent feasible, be planned, designed, constructed, and operated to provide for effective use by the elderly or handicapped." S. REP.
No. 93-111, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1974).
27. Pub. L. No. 93-643, § 105, 88 Stat. at 2282-83.
28. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1976), Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 504, 87 Stat. 394.
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United States. . .shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded
from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving federal financial
assistance. ' 29 The legislative history and language of section 504 reveal Congress' belief that isolation of the handicapped from mainstream society stemmed from discrimination. 30 Transportation was one
area in which this discrimination was evident, and the 1974 amendments to the Act, 3 ' which expanded the definition of "handicapped individuals" under section 504,32 indicate that section 504 was intended
29. Id. Section 504 was patterned after, and is almost identical to, the antidiscrimination language of§ 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VI, § 601, 78
Stat. 252 (1964) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000(d)(1) (1976)) which states: "[N]o
person in the United States, shall, on the ground of race, color, national origin, handicap,
religion, or sex, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving federal financial assistance
... " Id. at 99.
30. The handicapped person "is all too often excluded from schools and educational
programs, barred from employment or is under-employed because of archaic attitudes toward the handicapped, denied access to transportation, buildings and housing because of
architectural barriers and lack of planning, and is discriminated against by our public laws."
S. REP. No. 319, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1973).
31. S.REP. No. 1297, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 38 reprintedin 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEws 6373; see Pub. L. No. 93-516, 88 Stat. 1617 (1974). The amendments were designed to
bring about maximum participation by individuals with handicaps in the assessment, planning, and implementation of a White House Conference on the Handicapped and in the
development of recommendations for administrative action and legislation to be presented
to the President and the Congress. Id. The Rehabilitation Act was again later amended by
the Rehabilitation, Comprehensive Services and Developmental Disabilities Act of 1978.
Pub. L. No. 95-602, 92 Stat. 2955 (1978). This latter amendment pertained to the award of
attorneys' fees under § 503 for federal contractors' failure to advance in employment qualified handicapped individuals. See 29 U.S.C. § 793(a) (Supp. III 1979).
32. Commenting on these amendments, the Senate Committee on Labor and Public
Welfare stated: "Section 504 was enacted to prevent discrimination against all handicapped
individuals, regardless of their need for, or ability to benefit from, vocational rehabilitation
services, in relation to employment, housing, transportation, education, health services, or
any other federally-aided programs." Id. (emphasis added). After § 504 was enacted, the
question arose whether the statute provided an implied private right of action. In several of
the early suits by handicapped persons against transit systems, some courts held it would be
unreasonable to require accessibility to buses when the necessary technology was not available. See, e.g., United Handicapped Fed'n v. Andre, 409 F. Supp. 1297, 1300-02 (D. Minn.
1976), remanded, 558 F.2d 413 (8th Cir. 1977) (appeals court requiring good faith efforts at
modifications within a reasonable time); Webb v. Miami Valley Regional Transit Auth., No.
C-3-75-67, slip op. (S.D. Ohio Jan. 8, 1976); Bohlke v. Golden Gate Bridge Highway &
Transp. Dist., No. 73662, slip op. (Superior Court, Marin County, Cal., May 8, 1975). However, inLloyd v. Regional Transp. Auth., 548 F.2d 1277 (7th Cir. 1977), the court of appeals
vacated and remanded a district court ruling and held that § 504 created affirmative rights
and that a private cause of action could be implied to enforce those rights. Id. at 1281. Even
when courts concluded that handicapped persons could not compel bus accessibility, plaintiffs were allowed to block purchases of buses until it could be demonstrated that the statutory regulations were being followed. See, e.g., United Handicapped Fed'n v. Andre, 409 F.
Supp. at 1300. Later, when manufacturers offered optional wheelchair accessibility features,
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to address discriminatory practices against the physically handicapped
inmass transportation and other areas.
Federal Regulations: "Special Efforts" v. Concept of
Mainstreaming
In 1976, the Department of Transportation (DOT) issued regulations designed to implement section 504, section 16 of the UMTA, and
section 165(b) of the FAHA. 33 The 1976 DOT regulations required that
state and local planners make "special efforts" to plan public mass
transportation facilities and services that can effectively be utilized by
of federal project grants
elderly and handicapped persons. 34 Approval
35
efforts.
special
these
on
conditioned
was
The special efforts regulations were accompanied by guidelines illustrating the kinds of plans that would satisfy the requirements. The
guidelines allowed each local authority to choose a plan according to
local needs, and it became possible for a community to provide only
rather than to
door-to-door "special services" for the handicapped
36
make mainline transportation modes accessible.
On April 28, 1976, however, President Ford issued an Executive
Order that gave the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare
(HEW) 37 the responsibility to "coordinate the implementation of section 504 . . .by all federal departments and agencies . . . " and to
"establish guidelines for determining what are discriminatory practices,
within the meaning of section 504."38 The order also directed agencies
administering programs providing federal financial assistance to issue
the focus of the lawsuits changed to determining whether DOT's refusal to require access to
each bus was reasonable given the state of technology, and whether transit systems were
living up to the programming and implementation requirements of DOT's regulations. See
Leary v. Crapsey, 566 F.2d 863, 866 (2d Cir. 1977), in which the court of appeals reversed a
district court holding that § 504 did not create a private right of action on plaintiffs behalf.
The court remanded the case to the district court to consider whether the defendants were
complying with the regulation's "special efforts" requirements. See also Vanko v. Finley,
440 F. Supp. 656, 666 (N.D. Ohio 1977); Bartel v. Biernat, 427 F. Supp. 226, 233 (E.D. Wis.
1977); Young v. Coleman, Civ. No. 4-76-201 (D. Conn. Dec. 17, 1976).
33. See 41 Fed. Reg. 18,234 (1976).
34. See 46 Fed. Reg. 17,488 (1981). "Special efforts" continues to be defined in the
Code of Federal Regulations as "genuine good faith progress in planning services for wheelchair users and semi-ambulatory handicapped persons, . . .that is reasonable by comparison with the service provided to the general public and that meets a significant fraction of
the transportation needs of such persons during a reasonable time period." Id.
35. 41 Fed. Reg. 18,234 (1976).
36. Id.
37. The Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) is now referred to as
the Department of Health and Human Services. 20 U.S.C. § 3508(a) (Supp. IV 1980). This
Comment will use the former designation.
38. Exec. Order No. 11,914, 41 Fed. Reg. 17,871 (1976) (revoked by Exec. Order No.
12,250, 45 Fed. Reg. 72,995 (1980) giving implementation power to the Attorney General).
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consistent with the standards established by the Secretary
regulations
39
of HEW.

HEW issued its guidelines in 1978.40 Based upon its analysis of
the statute, it concluded that section 504 mandated full accessibility in
the most integrated setting appropriate to meet the needs of handicapped persons. 4 1 The regulations required that all recipients of federal funds "mainstream" handicapped persons, that is, integrate such
persons into the same programs available to others rather than treat
them as a separate group requiring "special" programs. 42 With respect
to public transportation, the HEW guidelines required that each indiand,
vidual mode of transportation be accessible to the handicapped
43
specifically, that new buses be accessible to wheelchair users.
In 1979, DOT followed these guidelines in promulgating its own
regulations for making mass transportation accessible to the handicapped.44 These regulations followed the bold "mainstreaming" initiative of the HEW guidelines by requiring that transit systems receiving
federal funds make each mode of public transportation accessible to
the handicapped by May 31, 1982.45 "Extraordinarily expensive"
structural changes to, or replacement of, existing vehicles or facilities,
46
however, could be accomplished over periods of up to ten years.
Moreover, particularly costly structural changes to rail systems could
be waived under certain conditions. 47 The DOT regulations indicated
that a transportation mode was accessible when it could be used by a
handicapped person in a wheelchair. 48 Buses purchased after July 2,
1979, were required to have wheelchair lifts and, at the end of ten
of their peakyears, transit systems were obligated to have one-half
49
hour bus service accessible to wheelchair users.
The 1979 DOT regulations replaced the "special efforts" requirements, 50 which emphasized separate transportation services for the
handicapped, with an innovative plan that met the needs of both hand39. Id. § 2.
40. See 45 C.F.R. § 85 (1981).
41. 43 Fed. Reg. 2,134 (1978).
42. See 45 C.F.R. § 85.51 (1981). In the guidelines' preamble, program accessibility
was defined as "the concept of prohibiting the exclusion of handicapped persons from programs by virtue of architectural barriers to such facilities as buildings, vehicles, and walks,
while not requiring that existing facilities be completely barrier-free." 43 Fed. Reg. 2,135
(1978).
43. 45 C.F.R. §§ 85.57(b), 85.58 (1978).
44. See, eg., 44 Fed. Reg. 31,442, 31,448-49 (1979).
45. 49 C.F.R. § 27.83(a)-27.95 (1980).
46. Id. § 27.85.
47. Id. § 27.99.
48. Id. § 27.85.
49. Id.
50. See supra note 34 & accompanying text.
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icapped and nonhandicapped members of the traveling public in an
integrated, equal setting. Under the guidelines, "separate treatment"
could be provided "only where necessary to ensure equal opportunities
and truly effective benefits and services."' 5' Transit authorities were obligated under the 1979 DOT regulations to make mass transportation
accessible to all persons, including the handicapped. This process
marked a giant52step towards incorporating the handicapped into mainstream society.
Court Decisions
American Public TransitAssociation v. Lewis
In American Public Transit Association v. Lewis, 53 a voluntary
trade association and eleven of its transit system members appealed a
lower court decision 54 that upheld the validity of the 1979 DOT regulations. Plaintiffs in the district court argued that these regulations were
in excess of authority as stated under section 504, section 16 of the
UMTA, and section 165(b) of the FAHA.5 5 They also contended that
the regulations were procedurally defective because DOT had not considered all relevant issues, options, and comments during the rulemaking process, and that the decision to issue the regulations was arbitrary
56
and capricious.
In granting the government's motion for summary judgment, the
district court found that the DOT regulations were a valid exercise of
the Transportation Secretary's authority to establish grant conditions
for programs receiving federal financial assistance. 57 The district court
further ruled that these statutes imposed upon the Secretary an affirmative obligation to provide mass transportation services for the handicapped. 58 The court noted that a variety of practical factors, including
the changing nature of available technology and the heterogeneous nature of the handicapped community had prompted Congress to entrust
59
to the Secretary the choice of means for providing those services.
The court expressly rejected the defendants' argument that these
51.

45 C.F.R. § 85.51(b)(iv) (1981).

52.

See supra notes 4, 20-21 & accompanying text.

53.

655 F.2d 1272 (D.C. Cir. 1981).

54. American Pub. Transit Ass'n v. Goldschmidt, 485 F. Supp. 811 (D.D.C. 1980).
55. Id. at 821.
56.

Id. Petitioners also alleged below that the DOT regulations that were intended to

increase accessibility of the handicapped to mass transportation constituted "major federal
action" and were violative of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 4321-4361 (1976), because DOT had not prepared an environmental impact statement.
485 F. Supp. at 821.
57. 485 F. Supp. at 823.
58.

Id.

59.

Id.
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statutes required a "local options" approach.60 Although the court
concluded that section 504 formed part of the basis for the Secretary's
in large part upon the transportation
authority, it predicated its holding
61
statutes relied upon by DOT.
The district court also rejected the argument advanced by plaintiffs that the DOT regulations had been adopted in an arbitrary and
capricious manner.62 Instead, it concluded that DOT had carefully considered a number of alternatives to the mainline accessibility approach
embodied in the HEW guidelines and that, in adopting the regulations,
that the approach to be imthe Department had reasonably concluded
63
plemented was technologically feasible.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reversed the
district court decision on the ground that, although section 504 bans
discrimination, it does not require a transit authority to make "burdensome modifications" to its existing facilities in order to accommodate
the handicapped. 64 The court ruled that section 504 does not give authority to the Secretary to mandate full accessibility of transportation
modes to the handicapped, but it reserved judgment on the scope and
authority of the UMTA and FAHA.6 5 It66 remanded the case to the district court for a finding on these issues.
In reaching its decision regarding the scope of section 504, the appellate court sought to apply the rationale used by the United States
Supreme Court in Southeastern Community College v. Davis,67 a decision that also interpreted section 504. The Southeastern decision, however, is inapposite and misleading in the Lewis context.
Southeastern Community College v. Davis

The plaintiff in Southeastern, a deaf student, applied for admission
to Southeastern Community College's nursing program. On the basis
of an examination of the plaintiff by an audiologist, her application was
denied on the ground that, even with a hearing aid, she would be unable to participate fully in the wide range of the program's activities.68
In a suit charging violation of section 504, the district court held that
60. Id. at 824-25.
61. Id. at 823.
62. Id. at 824-25.
63. Id.
64. 655 F.2d 1272, 1278 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
65. Id. at 1280.
66. ld. The court ordered a determination by the DOT of the validity of the regulations under other statutes because it concluded that a reviewing court may not presume that
an administrator would have made the same decision on other grounds. Id at 1278 (citing
SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947)).
67. 442 U.S. 397 (1979).
68. Id. at 400-01.
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plaintiff was not an "otherwise qualified handicapped individual"
within the meaning of the statute because she was unable to function
"sufficiently" in the program in spite of her handicap. 69 The Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, although not disputing the district
court's finding of fact, ruled that the lower court had misconstrued section 504 and, in light of new regulations promulgated after the lower
court's decision, concluded that Southeastern College had to consider
plaintiff's 70application for admission without regard to her hearing
disability.
In reviewing the school's actions, the Supreme Court held that, in
making admissions decisions, the school could consider physical qualifications necessary for the safe and successful completion of its nursing
program. 7 1 The Court stated that an "otherwise qualified person"
under section 504 means a person able to72meet all the requirements of a
program despite possessing a handicap.
The Court concluded that, under section 504, a program need not
take substantial affirmative action to remove barriers for the handicapped. 73 This ruling, however, was notably qualified. It did not eliminate the possibility that program modifications would, in some
instances, be required in order to comply with the nondiscrimination
mandate of section 504.74 The Court emphasized that reliance upon
past practices and failure to remove barriers that unnecessarily impede
the handicapped could, in some instances, be regarded as discrimination against qualified handicapped individuals. 7 5 The Court, however,
deny the plaintiffs application based on the
upheld the school's right to
76
particular facts involved.
69.

424 F. Supp. 1341, 1345 (E.D.N.C. 1976). Under § 504, an "otherwise qualified"

handicapped person could not be excluded solely by reason of a handicap. See supra notes
29-30 & accompanying text.
70. 574 F.2d 1158, 1161 (4th Cir. 1978).
71. 442 U.S. at 405-07.
72. Id. at 406.
73. Id. at 410-12. The Supreme Court reserved judgment on whether the statute created a private right of action. Id. at 404 n.5.
74. See id. at 412-13.

75. The Court carefully noted: "We do not suggest that the line between a lawful refusal to extend affirmative action and illegal discrimination against handicapped persons
always will be clear. It is possible to envision situations where an insistence on continuing
past requirements and practices might arbitrarily deprive genuinely qualified handicapped
persons of the opportunity to participate in a covered program. Technological advances can
be expected to enhance opportunities to rehabilitate the handicapped. . . without imposing
undue financial and administrative burdens upon a State. Thus, situationsmay arisewhere a
refusalto modify an existingprogrammight become unreasonableand discriminatory. Identification of those instances where a refusal to accommodate the needs of a disabled person
amounts to discrimination against the handicapped continues to be an important responsibility of HEW." Id. (emphasis added).
76. Id. at 414.
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The Southeastern decision did not establish a sweeping prohibition
against requiring program modification as a condition to receipt of federal funds. On the contrary, the Court held only that "substantial adjustments in existing programs beyond those necessary to eliminate
discriminationagainstotherwise qual4fedindividuals" were not required
by section 504. 77 The Court suggested that imposition of "undue
financial and administrative burdens" upon a state might dictate
against requiring certain kinds of program modifications. 78 Nonetheless, this language implicitly recognizes that certain programmatic adbe necessary to avoid discrimination against the
justments might
79
handicapped.
Southeastern established a flexible standard for determining when
modifications are required. This standard requires that modifications
be made where necessary to accommodate qualified handicapped persons. It applies not only to determining the extent of affirmative action
required, but also to determining which areas of human activity require
programmatic adjustments to accommodate "otherwise qualified"
handicapped persons. The Court, in referring to situations in which a
lawful refusal to modify a program might be unreasonable and unlawful, recognizes that varying degrees of program modification may be
required in different contexts.80 Thus, the Court emphasized that the
scope of section 504, though limited, was flexible enough to require a
greater or lesser degree of affirmative action based on "technological
advances" and practical considerations in a particular field.8 For this
reason, the result reached by the Supreme Court in the context of education is not necessarily defensible in the transportation arena.8 2 The
"undue burdens" that the Court sought to restrict in the educational
context in Southeastern are not necessarily relevant when considering
mass transportation programs. As Judge Edwards noted in Lewis, "in
considering the accessibility of public transportation to otherwise qualified handicapped persons, it is much more difficult to avoid 'discrimi77. Id. at 410 (emphasis added).
78. Id. at 412.
79. Id. at 412-13.
80. Id. See supra note 75.
81. 442 U.S. at 412-13.
82. In his concurring opinion in Lewis, Judge Edwards noted: "I express no opinion
here on the extremely complicated question of whether the regulations exceed the permissible scope of section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act by imposing on transit authorities a requirement of 'affirmative action' as opposed to one of 'non-discrimination.' In my opinion,
the applicationof section 304 to public transportationsystems raisessome questions that are
signycantly djiierentfrom those consideredby the Supreme Court in the highereducation setting in Southeastern Community College v. Davis." However, the judge agreed with the majority that the case should be remanded so that DOT could clarify its proper statutory
authority for the regulations. 655 F.2d 1272, 1281 (D.C. Cir. 1981). (Edwards, J., concurring) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
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nation' without taking some kind of 'affirmative action.' ",83
Southeastern also can be distinguished from Lewis on its facts. In
Southeastern, the plaintiff required immediate hearing aid assistance
and special attention from instructors in order to complete the nursing
program offered by the school.8 4 The plaintiff essentially was unable to
take part in the clinical phase of the nursing program because of her
hearing disability and would not have received even a rough equivalent
of the normal training. The Court found that a fundamental alteration
such as that required to enable the plaintiff to participate in the 8pro5
gram was more than the "modification" the regulation required. It
noted:
lOin the present record it appears unlikely respondent could benefit
from any affirmative action that the regulation reasonably could be
interpreted as requiring . . . . [T]he record indicates that nothing
less than close, individual attention by a nursing instructor would be
sufficient to ensure patient safety if respondent took part in the
clinical phase of the nursing program. . . . In light of respondent's
inability to function in clinical courses without close supervision,
Southeastern, with prudence, could allow her to take only academic
classes. Whatever benefits respondent might realize from such a
course of study, she would not receive even 8a6rough equivalent of the
training a nursing program normally gives.
Contrary to the necessity of immediate modification in Southeastern, the regulations at issue in Lewis required local transit authorities
to make modifications in their systems, but allowed up to ten years to
meet the requirements.8 7 In addition, the regulations included exceptions such as a special waiver that allowed rail transit systems to plan
method of service in conjunction with handicapped
an alternative
88
consultants.
The modification required by the regulations at issue in Lewis did
not amount to a fundamental alteration in the nature of a mass transit
system. The regulations did not, for example, require changes in
scheduling or in the number of buses or trains in the system, nor did
they interfere with day-to-day management of a system. They merely
required the implementation, over a long period of time, of available
devices allowing wheelchair access to public transit vehicles. Such de83. Id.
84. 442 U.S. at 408-09.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id. at 409-10.
Id.
44 Fed. Reg. 31,442, 31,477-79 (1979); 49 C.F.R. §§ 27.83-27.95 (1980).
44 Fed. Reg. at 31,480; 49 C.F.R. § 27.99. In Lewis, the district court found in the

record that the DOT had a reasonable basis for believing that feasible wheelchair-lifts were
either currently available or would be available by the time any new buses were ready for
delivery. The district court also found "substantial" evidence concerning the feasibility of

accessible rail systems. 428 F. Supp. 811, 829 (D.D.C. 1980).
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vices are necessary to enable an otherwise qualified group of citizens to
make use of the system.
Dopico V. Goldschmidt

This distinction was recognized in a recent Second Circuit decision, Dopico v. Goldschmidt.8 9 In this action, plaintiffs, individually
and as representatives of all wheelchair-bound persons in New York
City, initiated two consolidated class actions in the district court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief.90 The principal local defendants
were the New York City Transit Authority, the Metropolitan Transportation Authority, and the New York City Department of Transportation. The federal defendants were officials of the United States
Department of Transportation (DOT) and the Urban Mass Transportation Administration. 9 1
Plaintiffs claimed that the local defendants, recipients of federal

mass transit assistance funds, failed to provide wheelchair users with

accessible mass transportation. 92 Plaintiffs also contended that the fed-

eral defendants approved transit grants to the local defendants although they knew or should have known that those defendants had
93

failed to make satisfactory "special efforts" as required by the statute.

The district court granted the local defendants' motion to dismiss

for failure to state a claim for which relief could be granted and94also
entered summary judgment in favor of the federal defendants.

It

ruled that section 16 of the UMTA does not create a private right of
action when considered in light of the United States Supreme Court
of
decision in Cori v. Ash, 95 and plaintiffs conceded that section 165(b)
96

the FAHA did not create a private right of action in their favor.

89. 518 F. Supp. 1161 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), rev'd in part, 687 F.2d 644 (2d Cir. 1982).
90. 518 F. Supp. at 1165.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 1165-66.
93. Id. at 11"66. See supra note 34.
94. 518 F. Supp. at 1190.
95. Id. at 1171-74. In Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975), the Supreme Court found several factors relevant in determining whether a private remedy is implicit in a statute not
expressly providing one. "First, is the plaintiff 'one of the class for whose special benefit the
statute was enacted'... that is, does the statute create a federal right in favor of the plaintiff? Second, is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create
a remedy or to deny one? ... Third, is it consistent with the underlying purposes of the
legislative scheme to imply such a remedy for the plaintiff?. ... And, finally, is the cause of
action one traditionally relegated to state law, in an area basically the concern of the states,
so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal law?" Id.
at 78.
96. 518 F. Supp. at 1174 n.49. The court also ruled that § 1983 of the Civil Rights Act,
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976), did not authorize suit for violation of these statutory provisions
because neither § 16 of the UMTA nor § 165(b) of the FAHA created substantive rights
enforceable under § 1983. Id. at 1176-78. The court also held that plaintiff had not stated a
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The district court further ruled that section 504 was limited and
thus could not be used to authorize the kind of "massive relief' that
plaintiffs sought in this action. 97 The court analogized plaintiffs' request with the "kind of burdensome modifications" that the Southeastern court held to be beyond the scope of section 504.98 The district
court cited the Lewis decision with approval in reaching its
conclusion. 99
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the district
court's ruling in regard to section 16 of the UMTA, section 165(b) of
the FAHA, and the constitutional issues.100 However, it reversed the
district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' claim under section 504 and the
summary judgment granted in favor of the federal defendants. The
court ruled that even if plaintiffs' prayer for relief could be characterized as excessive under the 1979 DOT mainstreaming regulations, the
district court still had inherent power to fashion less ambitious intermediate relief if a violation of section 504 was found.101 The court distinguished Southeastern by noting that in that action, nothing short of
fundamental modifications would have accomplished plaintiffs admission to the defendant's nursing program, whereas in the present action,
a wide range of prospective relief was available to meet at least some of
plaintiffs' concerns if they proved their allegations. 10 2 Therefore, even
if plaintiffs' prayer for relief could be deemed to exceed the mandate of
section 504, more modest relief within the limits of Southeastern was
still available.10 3 Moreover, the court noted that plaintiffs also had alleged violations of the 1976 "special efforts" regulations, which, though
superfluous after the later amendments, were never officially withdrawn by DOT and remained in effect as possible support for plaintiffs'
valid equal protection claim because defendants' actions were rational and not arbitrary or
capricious. Id. at 1178-79.
97. Id. at 1175-76.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 1175.
100. 687 F.2d at 648-49.
101. Id. at 650.
102. Id.
103. Id. The court in Dopico also distinguished the recent decision of Board of Educ. v.
Rowley, 102 S. Ct. 3034 (1982), in which the United States Supreme Court ruled that the
Education for All Handicapped Children Act (EAHCA), 20 U.S.C. § 1401 (1976), did not
require a local school district to provide a sign-language interpreter for a deaf child already
receiving sufficient educational benefits. The Court held that the EAHCA was not structured like § 504 and so could not impair that section's authority to require some degree of
"positive effort" to expand availability of federally funded programs to otherwise qualified
handicapped persons. 687 F.2d at 643 n.6. Moreover, the Dopico court indicated that in
Rowley, the United States Supreme Court concluded that the specific relief that had been
ordered exceeded the educational benefit already being provided to the plaintiff whereas, in
this action, the plaintiffs had not yet been heard on the issue of whether the statutory requirements of § 504 have been met. Id.
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claims.1o4
The court of appeals also noted that use of the term "affirmative
action" as used by the United States Supreme Court in Southeastern
was particularly misleading in the transportation context. Dopico did
or
not involve a challenged program that had set goals for the hiring
05 Inenrollment of compensatory numbers of a disadvantaged class.
stead, the issue in that action involved a public service that plaintiffs
were entitled to use but that was not practically available to them.
Moreover, the court emphasized in this regard that the action was free
of the question of reverse discrimination and the associated problem of
changes in selection criteria necessary to widen the pool of qualified
applicants.10 6 Thus, it concluded that the issue involved was purely
was
economic and administrative, and that the primary consideration
10 7
one of practicality rather than entitlement, merit or restitution.
The Dopico decision supports the view that section 504 by itself,
and in conjunction with other statutes, can be used to require local
transit authorities to make reasonable modifications to their systems in
order to accommodate qualified handicapped persons. The court's
conclusion that practicality rather than entitlement is the primary consideration in deciding cases of accessible transportation suggests that
reasonable modifications within the Southeastern guidelines could
practically include accessibility options on mainline transit systems
similar to those established by the 1979 DOT regulations. In fact, such
accessibility options on mainline systems are less "burdensome" than
the immediate modifications that were required in Southeastern because of the extent of available federal funding for mass transportation.
at the time respondent
No such funds were available to Southeastern
sought admission to its nursing program. 08
Factorsof Costs and FederalFunding

The Southeastern Court noted that the amended provisions of section 504 recognized that on occasion the elimination of discrimination
might involve some costs, and therefore authorized grants to the states.
However, no such grants were available to Southeastern to defray the
costs of program modification.' 0 9 The Court nevertheless explicitly
recognized that "in some future case" the availability of funds to re104. The 1976 "special efforts" regulations remained in the Code of Federal Regulations
throughout the brief life of the 1979 regulations. See 46 Fed. Reg. 17,488 (1981). See also
supra note 34. The court of appeals therefore concluded that they were superseded only in
the sense of being rendered superfluous but were never voided. 687 F.2d at 650-51.
105. 687 F.2d at 652.
106. Id. at 653.
107. Id.
108. 442 U.S. at 411 n.10.
109. Id.
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move barriers that unnecessarily impede the handicapped would be an
appropriate factor to consider when determining the existence of unlawful discrimination. 1 0 In Lewis, the court stressed the costs of the
required modifications but neglected to examine the availability of federal funding for such modifications. In fact, extensive funding was
available in the form of grants authorized by several statutory
sources" I and such funding was conditioned on compliance with the
requirements of section 504.'12 The legislative history of the transportation statutes and of section 504, coupled with the amount of federal
funding available for mass transit systems, leads to the conclusion that
Congress intended to impose mainstreaming as a condition to receipt of
such funds.
The subject of conditional grants was discussed by the Supreme
Court recently in Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman.113
In Pennhurst, the respondent, a retarded resident of Pennhurst State
110. Id.
111. Federal financial assistance for mass transportation programs comes from three
statutory sources. The first is the "discretionary capital grant" program administered by
DOT under § 3 of the UMTA, 49 U.S.C. § 1602. Under that program, the Secretary is
authorized to approve applications by states or local bodies for discretionary grants "on such
terms and conditions as he may prescribe" for the construction of mass transportation facilities and for the purchase of rolling stock, including buses. Id. § 1602(a)(1). Under that
program, DOT pays for 80% of the project's costs. Id. § 1603(a). The discretionary capital
grant program constitutes a major source of funds for public transit programs. In a 1978
amendment to the UMTA, Pub. L. No. 599 § 303, 92 Stat. 2737, 2737-38 (1978) (codified at
49 U.S.C. § 1603(c)(3)(A)), Congress authorized appropriations for over $1.3 billion for
fiscal year 1979 for the capital grants authorized by § 3. Authorizations increase for future
years and currently extend through fiscal year 1982. Of the amounts authorized in fiscal
year 1979, Congress appropriated over $1.2 billion. Pub. L. No. 75-335, 92 Stat. 443 (1978).
The second major statutory source of funds for mass transit programs is found in § 5 of
the UMTA, 49 U.S.C. § 1604 (1976), the "formula grant" program. Section 5 authorizes the
Secretary "on such terms and conditions as he may prescribe" to approve applications for
grants based on a statutory formula for the purchase of buses and other capital expenses and
to assist mass transportation systems to pay operating expenses. Id § 1604(d)(1). Under
this program, DOT's share of an operating assistance grant is a maximum of 50%. Id
§ 1604(e). As with the discretionary grant program, the Department's share of a grant for
buses or other capital facilities is 80%. In the formula grant program, Congress authorized
appropriations of over $1.5 billion for fiscal 1979. Id. § 1604. The amount of funds each
urbanized area is eligible to receive varies according to such factors as population and population density.
Finally, under the interstate substitution program authorized by the Federal-Aid Highway Act, 23 U.S.C. § 103(e)(4) (1976), the Secretary is authorized to use federal highway
funds for mass transportation program grants. At a state's request, federal funds that would
otherwise be available for interstate highways may instead be used, with DOT's approval,
for the construction of public mass transit projects. Id. § 142(a), (b).
112. See supra notes 20 & 26.
113. 446 F. Supp. 1295 (E.D. Pa. 1978), affd in part, 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979), rev'd,
451 U.S. 1 (1981), decree modjed on remand, 673 F.2d 647 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. granted, 102
S. Ct. 2956 (1982).
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School, brought a class action suit in federal district court on behalf of
herself and all other Pennhurst residents against that institution and
various officials responsible for its operation. Respondent alleged that
conditions at the institution were unsanitary, inhumane, and danger-

ous, and that the institution denied the class members equal protection

under the law. 1 14 Suit was brought under the eighth and fourteenth
amendments of the United States Constitution, section 504, the Devel-

opmentally Disabled Assistance and Bill of Rights Act of 1975,115 and
the Pennsylvania Mental Health and Mental Retardation Act of

1966.116 The district court held that the mentally retarded have a constitutional right to be provided with "minimally adequate habilitation"
in the "least restrictive environment." 1 7 The court held that both section 504 and the Pennsylvania Mental Health and Mental Retardation
Act of 1966 also provided such a right." l8
Although the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the
lower court order, it avoided the constitutional questions raised. The

court premised its ruling on the Developmentally Disabled Assistance
and Bill of Rights Act, which the court found created an implied right
of action on behalf of mentally retarded persons."

9

The Supreme

Court reversed, stating that there was "nothing in the Act or its legisla-

tive history to suggest that Congress intended to require [sjtates to assume the high cost of providing 'appropriate treatment' in the 'least
restrictive environment' to their mentally retarded citizens." 20 Instead,
the Court concluded that the Act's language and structure demonstrated that it was a voluntary federal-state funding statute and rejected

the argument that its provisions were made compulsory pursuant to

Congress' power to enact legislation under the spending power' 2 ' or the
fourteenth amendment. 122
114. 451 U.S. at 6.
115. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6000-6081 (1976).
116. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 50 §§ 4101-4704 (Purdon 1966).
117. 446 F. Supp. at 1314-20.
118. Id. at 1322-24. The district court also held that respondent's constitutional right
under the eighth amendment "to be free from harm" had been violated and that respondent
was also entitled to be provided with "non-discriminatory habilitation" under the equal
protection clause. Id. at 1320-22.
119. 612 F.2d 84, 107 (3d Cir. 1979).
120. 451 U.S. at 18.
121. Id. at 17-19. The spending power incorporated in article I, section 8, clause 1, of
the Constitution provides: "Congress shall have power to... provide for the ... general
welfare of the United States." The Supreme Court recognizes Congress' power to fix the
terms and conditions on which it grants federal money to the states. See, e.g., Rosado v.
Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970); King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968); Oklahoma v. Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127 (1947).
122. 451 U.S. at 18. Section 5 of the fourteenth amendment provides that "Congress
shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." For
decisions on Congress' power to secure the guarantees of this amendment, see Fitzpatrick v.
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The Court stated that, under the rule of statutory construction,

"Congress must clearly express its intent to impose conditions on the
grant of federal funds so that the states can knowingly decide whether

or not to accept those funds."' 123 This rule is particularly applicable in
cases where the states' potential obligation is undetermined. 124 Therefore, if Congress does not clearly impose conditions on the states' restates have no obligation to fund the federally
ceipt of federal funds,
25

mandated policies.
The Court also noted that the relatively small amount of federal
aid that was appropriated to Pennsylvania in this instance indicated

that Congress had not intended to create substantive rights for individuals covered by the Act. 126 In fact, the Secretary of Health and Human

Services, the official responsible for administering the Act, admitted
that he had no authority to withhold funds from states that failed to
meet the provisions of the Act. 127 The Court ruled that this was conclusive that Congress did not intend that the provisions of the Act be
128
mandatory.
It is clear, however, that Congress did intend the provisions of section 504, in the context of mass transportation, to be mandatory. ConBitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970); Katzenbach v. Morgan,
384 U.S. 641 (1966).
123. 451 U.S. at 24.
124. Id.
holding inSoutheastern and noted:
125. Id. at 17. The Court made brief reference to its
"The Court below failed to recognize the well-settled distinction between Congressional 'encouragement' of state programs and the imposition of binding obligations on the states
I.... Relying on that distinction, this court in Southeastern Community College v. Davis
...rejected a claim that Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which bars discrimination against handicapped persons in federally funded programs, obligated schools to take
affirmative steps to eliminate problems raised by an applicant's hearing disability. Finding
that 'state agencies such as Southeastern are only encourage[d] . . . to adopt such policies
and procedures, . .

.'

we stressed that Congress understood that accommodations of the

needs of handicapped individuals may require affirmative action and knew how to provide
for it in those instances where it wished to do so." Id. at 27. See supra notes 75, 82 &
accompanying text.
126. 451 U.S. at 24: "The fact that Congress granted to Pennsylvania only $1.6 million
in 1976, a sum woefully inadequate to meet the enormous financial burden of providing
Iappropriate' treatment in the 'least restrictive' setting, confirms that Congress must have
had a limited purpose in enacting section 6010. When Congress does impose affirmative
obligations on the states, it usually makes a far more substantial contribution to defray the
costs."

127. Id.
128. Id. On remand, the court of appeals held that Pennsylvania's Mental Health and
Mental Retardation Act provided adequate support, independent of federal law, for the federal court's order enjoining institutionalization of mentally retarded citzens. 673 F.2d at
656. The court also held that the eleventh amendment did not bar the federal court from
entering its order enjoining institutionalization of mentally retarded citizens. Id. at 659, cert.
granted, 102 S.Ct. 2956 (1982).
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gress has strongly indicated that mass transportation accessible to a
wide cross-section of the population is a national priority. 29 This concern is reflected in statements by members of Congress 30 and in the
extent of federal funding for accessible mass transit systems131
which, in
some instances, covers up to eighty percent of capital costs.
The conditional terms under which states receive federal transportation funds and the authority granted to the Secretary of Transportation to condition grants 32 on local compliance with section 504 and
other statutes support the view that Congress clearly expressed its intent that mass transportation be made accessible and that states that
accept
federal funding knowingly undertake their share of that obligation. 133 Congressional policy in this area, therefore, cannot be viewed
as "only wishful thinking on the part of Congress or as some fanciful
role in the implementation"' 34 of accessible mass transportation.
It is also clear that Congress understood the provisions of section
504 to require mainstreaming in mass transportation. The legislative
history and the language of section 504 reflect a belief that the isolation
of handicapped persons from mainstream society stems from discrimination. 35 In addition, subsequent legislation indicates a congressional
understanding that, at least with respect
to mass transit, mainstreaming
36
is required to end discrimination.1
In Southeastern, plaintiffs introduced into evidence the statements
of certain members of Congress indicating that they viewed section 504
as requiring affirmative efforts. 137 The Court found that these statements, made after the passage of section 504, did not constitute valid
evidence of congressional intent and noted: "Nor do these comments,
none of which represents the will of Congress as a whole, constitute
subsequent 'legislation' such as this court
might weigh in construing the
meaning of an earlier enactment."' 38
129. See 49 U.S.C. § 1612 (1970). See also supra text accompanying note 18.
130. See supra note 21.
131. See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 1603(a) (1976). See supra note 111.
132. The Secretary is authorized to approve applications by states or local bodies for
grants "on such terms and conditions as he may prescribe." 49 U.S.C. § 1602(a)(1) (1976)
(emphasis added). See supra notes 20 & 111.
133. See Pennhurst, 451 U.S. at 24. See also Board of Educ. v. Rowley, 102 S. Ct. 3034,
3049-50 n.26 (1982). The legislative history of the EAHCA, 20 U.S.C. § 1401 (1976), indicates that Congress did not intend to impose conditional requirements on the states. See
supra note 105.
134. 451 U.S. at 40. (White, Brennan, and Marshall, JJ. dissenting). The dissenters in
Pennhurst argued that Congress intended state compliance with § 6010 to be a precondition
of receipt of federal funds. Id
135. See supra notes 30 & 32.
136. See supra notes 20 & 26.
137. 442U.S. at411-12n.ll.
138. Id.
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In Lewis, however, there was valid evidence of congressional intent. Section 504 was passed in 1973. In 1975, Congress amended the
FAHA to require that mass transit projects funded with federal highway funds be constructed and operated to allow effective utilization by
handicapped persons. 39 In addition, when appropriating the UMTA
budget for 1975, Congress attached a rider to the bill emphasizing that
all funds had to be used to design and purchase accessible means of
transportation.1 40 These amendments constitute the type of subsequent
legislation referred to in Southeastern and demonstrate Congress' understanding of the actions necessary to eliminate discrimination against
the handicapped in the area of mass transportation.
In addition to the amendments to the UMTA and the FAHA,
Congress demonstrated its intent to require "mainstreaming" each time
after 1978 that it appropriated money under those statutes and conditioned grants of such money on compliance with section 504.141 Once
HEW had issued regulations mandating mainstreaming, the continued
conditioning of money upon compliance with section 504 can be
viewed as an indication of Congress' understanding that such mainstreaming was required by the section. Thus, congressional intent that
handicapped persons be mainstreamed into mass transit systems was
well demonstrated before the implementation of the 1979 DOT
regulations.
Moreover, although the Supreme Court in Southeastern held that
"substantial adjustments in existing programs beyond those necessary
to eliminate discrimination against otherwise qualified individuals"
were not required by section 504,142 it is doubtful whether mainstreaming in the area of mass transportation could be accomplished without
modifications such as those required by the 1979 DOT regulations.
Once the idea of separate transportation facilities for otherwise qualified handicapped persons is rejected as inherently discriminatory, making existing systems accessible to all individuals is the only viable way
to prevent the discrimination forbidden by section 504.
The Court in Southeastern suggested that the imposition of "undue financial and administrative burdens" upon a state may dictate
against requiring certain kinds of program modifications. 143 The Lewis
court found that such burdens were imposed by the 1979 DOT regulations. 44 However, the court failed to consider that the financial bur139.

Federal-Aid Highway Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-643, § 105, 88 Stat.

2281, 2282-83 (1975) (codified at 23 U.S.C. § 142 (1976)). See supra note 26.
140. See supra note 20.
141. The terms for congressional funding of accessible mass transportation remained
unchanged after passage of the mainstreaming requirements. See supra note 111.
142. 442 U.S. at 410.
143. Id. at 412.

144.

655 F.2d at 1278.
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dens were alleviated by federal funding, a factor not present in
4 5
In addition, the court could point to no fundamental
Southeastern.1

alteration of the nature of the program such as would create administrative burdens. It is because of the court's failure to distinguish the
issues involved in Lewis from those raised in the context of education
that a mechanical application of the Southeastern analysis and an erroneous and inequitable result were inevitable.

Conclusion
Millions of individuals depend upon mass transportation for their
livelihood. It is central to the survival of trade and human interaction.146 Practical considerations reflecting the national interest demand
that such an integral system be geared to accommodate the needs of
most, if not all, of the population. Such an approach has distinct economic benefits since it encourages greater numbers of individuals to
become involved in the economic and social fabric of mainstream society.t47 Moreover, this approach denounces the policy of separate accommodations for the handicapped wherever feasible, 48 as well as the
stigma associated with such treatment. 149 The 1979 DOT regulations
mirrored congressional intent in this regard and their promulgation
was an important step in achieving these goals.
The Lewis decision, on the other hand, will have a debilitating
effect on efforts to make transportation modes accessible to the handicapped. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia failed to
define "undue financial and administrative burdens"'15 0 in the transportation area. The ambiguity involving such a central issue creates the
opportunity for conflicting interpretations at both the federal and local
levels and could be a springboard for further litigation on this issue.
In attempting to answer the different questions raised in the mass
transportation arena, the Lewis court applied an inflexible standard
that is unworkable and inappropriate in the transportation context.
145. See supra note 111 & accompanying text.
146. In 1977, buses carried 5.3 billion passengers in the United States. Subways, streetcars, and commuter rail carried an additional 2.25 billion people. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 658 (1978).
147. See supra notes 4, 21, 30 & accompanying text.
148. The HEW guidelines which laid the foundation for the DOT regulations stated:
"[Sleparate or different treatment can be permitted only where necessary to ensure equal opportunityand truly effective beneits andservices." 43 Fed. Reg. 2134 (emphasis added). See
supra note 26.
149. See Jones, Labels and Stigma in Special Education, 38 EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN
553, 560-61 (1972) (very act of labeling a child as "disabled" and placing him or her in a
separate program has a stigmatizing effect and often produces an education of inferior
quality).
150. 655 F.2d at 1278. See supra notes 75 & 82.
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The decision is contrary to the intent of section 504 and other related
statutes and misapplies the Supreme Court's ruling in Southeastern.
The court failed to recognize that the nature of mass transportation
demands greater "affirmative efforts" in order to accommodate "otherwise qualified" handicapped persons than are required in an area such
as education. Undue reliance on separate accommodations, rather
than mainstream transportation facilities for all qualified individuals, is

allow separate
discriminatory and intolerable. Society can no longer
5
standards for different segments of its citizenry.1 1
Winston Peters*

151. See Burgdorf & Burgdorf, A History of Unequal Treatment: The Qualqcation of
HandicappedPersons as a "Suspect Class" Under the Equal Protection Clause, 15 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 855 (1975). Congress now has before it for its review and consideration the
challenged DOT regulations. Both Houses of Congress have also proposed legislation to
permit alternate methods of satisfying § 504 and § 16 of the UMTA short of mainline accessibility. See Federal Public Transportation Act of 1980, S. 2720, and Surface Transportation
Act of 1980, H.R. 6417, 96th Cong. 2d Sess. (1980). See 126 CONG. REC. 8150-57 (June 25,
1980). The framework of these legislative proposals, along with the reports and debates,
indicates Congress' recognition that, absent modifying legislation, the Secretary of Transportation does have authority to ensure mass transportation services for the handicapped.
Therefore, the challenged DOT regulations constituted a legitimate exercise of the Secretary's authority. The Presidential Task Force on Regulatory Relief has also included the
DOT regulations and the HEW guidelines in its list of regulations scheduled for review and
possible modification pursuant to Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (1981).
* Member, Third Year Class.

